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Modeling China’s Climate Change Policy in The Post-2012 framework:
On The Perspective of Reputation
Edward Xuedong Wang1
Abstract
The post-2012 world Climate Change scenario would heavily depend on China’s next steps
on Climate Change Policy. The world could not coordinate their policies to slow global
warming without China’s participation. However, China, the world’s largest GHG emitter
with the rising energy demand, is reluctant to change its high-carbon economic development
models by sticking to the concept of Climate Injustice. The Economic Cost and Climate
Injustice are two major concerns Chinese government faces. This raises the issue of which
approach would be most likely to stimulate and persuade China to take appropriate actions in
the post-2012 climate regime.
This paper seeks to provide a tentative answer to this question. It compares quantityoriented mechanisms like the Kyoto Protocol with the price-type control mechanisms such
as internationally harmonized carbon taxes. It concludes that the price-type approach
incorporating the perspective of state reputation could visualize the possibility that China
would take new Climate Policy and low-carbon economic development models. It argues that
the sticks-type policies are most unlikely to push China to take actions or adopt measures
because China’s growing economic and military power, rising political influence, and
increasing involvement in regional and international institutions have fundamentally affected
the world system. However, since China builds up its reputation by focusing on the
multilateral commitments, the reputation-based price-type control mechanism could be the
Pareto Improvement that encourages China to contribute its fair share to the global climate
effort.
The pace and face of globalization in the 21 century will be critically influenced by
whether or not some specific issues that call for collective action by countries are properly
addressed. One of these big questions is to address the problem of global warming. The post2012 world climate change scenario would heavily depend on China’s next steps on climate
change policy partly because China, the world’s largest GHG emitter with the rising energy
demand, is reluctant to change its high-carbon economic development models by sticking to
the concept of climate injustice.
In this paper, I try to analyze the probability that China’ government would accept
some substantial GHG emission cut in the near future on the perspective of state reputation:
is it possible that China would take any substantial quantified emissions cut? If so, how could
that be? I consider these questions in this article. The first section describes the statistics of
China's growing greenhouse gas emissions. The next section describes China’s government's
unwillingness to accept any binding international commitments to reduce the emissions
substantially. The subsequent section describes the fundamental reason behind that. I then
describe the reputation-based price-type control mechanism that would be the tentative
approach to that issue. I close this paper with a summary of the major issues.
1. Introduction: China’s Fact Sheet
Climate change issue is a global concern to all the countries across the world. There is
overwhelming scientific consensus that human-induced climate change poses grave economic
and environmental risks. Driven primarily by a century and half of rising fossil fuel
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combustion, CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere had reached 379 parts per million by
2005, 35% higher than pre-industrial level (“4th Assessment Report, Working Group I,
Summary for Policy makers,” IPCC, 2007). Average global temperatures have risen by 0.76
degree Celsius since the late 1800s, and the effects are evident in extreme weather events,
changed weather patterns, floods, droughts, glacial and Arctic ice melt, rising sea levels, and
reduced biodiversity (IPCC, 2007). Scientists have studied extensively the global warming
issue, which holds that the accumulation of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases
(GHG) is expected to produce the significant climate changes over the 21st century.
Addressing growing concerns about climate change requires a broad understanding of its
social, economic, developmental, scientific, political and environmental aspects. Increase in
temperature as a result if increasing emissions of greenhouse gases will have serious impacts
on our economic well-being and on the ecosystems on which the health of our planet
depends.
Minimizing these risks required that global GHG emission decline dramatically over
the coming decades. In its causes and potential consequences, climate change has
implications for every inhabitant of every nation on earth. Yet the power to mobilize an
effective response rests largely with a handful of nations. As the largest developing country,
one of the largest energy consumers, and one of the largest greenhouse gases producers,
China’s attitude toward this issue would be very important.
As awareness of Kyoto’s complete inadequacy has increased, calls for participation
by developing countries have grown louder and more frequent. Accomplishing this goal will
be feasible only after China takes concerted and sustained action, because China began the
largest greenhouse gases emitter since 2007. So, Global pressure on China is mounting to
take on some obligations to reduce GHG emissions from the use of coal, oil, and gas, which
cause climate change, or global warming. But, as a developing country, China is actually
excluded from any quantitative obligations to reduce emissions. Some think this approach is
probably a fundamental mistake to the world map (Nordhaus, 2007). Before discussing
different approaches, it will be useful to sketch the scientific statistics on China’s contribution
on global warming. The Chinese plan to deal with global warming emissions includes
decreasing relative reliance on coal, developing renewable energy sources, a nationwide tree
planting campaign, population control, and other regulatory and public education measures.
The problem, of course, is that in absolute terms, the Chinese economy is huge. Nominally,
China now has the fourth largest economy in the world, after the U.S., Japan and Germany.
After adjusting for China's deliberately undervalued currency, China is the second largest
economy in the world, roughly eighty percent as big as the U.S. economy.
Furthermore, China is already attracting international attention for its rapidly growing
contribution to climate change. According to a 2007 report from the Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency, it has already surpassed the United States as the world’s
largest contributor of carbon dioxide. Fatih Birol, the chief economist of the international
Energy Agency, even warned that in 25 years China would emit twice as much carbon
dioxide as all the OECD countries. 2
The trend of climate change in China is generally consistent with that of global
climate change. According to the Initial National Communication on Climate Change of the
People’s Republic of China, China’s total GHG emissions in 1994 are 4,060 million tons of
CO2 equivalent (3,650 million tons of net emissions), of which 3,070 million tons of CO2,
730 million tons of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) of CH4 and 260 million tCO2e of N2O.
According to tentative estimates by experts from China, China’s total GHG emission in 2004
is about 6,100 tCO2e (5,600 million tons of net emissions), of which 5,050 million tons of
2
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CO2, 720 million tCO2e of CH4 and 330 million tCO2e of N2O. From 1994 to 2004, the
annual average growth rate of GHG emissions is around 4%, and the share of CO2 in total
GHG emissions increased from 76% to 83% (China’s National Climate change Program,
2007).
China’s historical GHG emissions are very low and per capita emissions have been
below the world average. According to the study carried out by the World Resource Institute
(WRI), China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion were 79 Mt in 1950, contributing
only 1.13% of the world total at that time; cumulative emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel
combustion accounted for only 9.33% of the world total during the period of 1950~2002, and
the cumulative CO2 emissions per capita are 61.7 tons over the same period, ranking the
92nd in the world. Statistics from the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicates that per
capita CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion were 3.65 tons in 2004 in China,
equivalent to only 87% of the world average and 33% of the level in Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Along with the steady social
and economic development, the emission intensity defined as the CO2 emission per unit of
GDP declined generally. According to IEA, China’s emission intensity falls to 2.76
kgCO2/US$ (constant 2000 U.S. dollar) in 2004, as compared to 5.47 kgCO2/US$ in 1990, a
49.5% decrease. For the same period, emission intensity of the world average dropped only
12.6% and that of the OECD countries dropped 16.1% (China’s National Climate change
Program, 2007).
2. China’s Climate Change Policy
As we know, China faces substantial challenges in mitigating its increasing contribution to
global greenhouse gas emissions, which will require a much higher level of effort than what
may be achieved by measures already in place. However, China is openly or in private hostile
to the idea of talking about post-2012 policy commitments. While the prospect of a long-term
meaningful post-2012 global climate pact depends on China’s participation in the near future.
China is facing two types of pressures: international ones and domestic ones. Internationally,
the large increases in GHG emission with the great economic growth in recent years have
pushed up China on the stage across the world. Domestically, cost increases include rising
wages, higher land lease fees, cuts in VAT export rebates, and imposition of export taxes on
energy intensive products.
China’s climate strategy remains centered on its energy development strategy as
driven by its overall economic development goals. Although attention to climate change has
recently increased among China’s leadership, climate change has not surpassed economic
development as a policy priority (Lewis, Joanna, 2007). By now, there are no indications that
international pressures are significantly affecting China’s government ‘s fundamental attitude
towards quantified GHG emission cut by now. Chinese government has published its first
national climate change program. In that program, China thinks the climate change issue
ultimately is “the issue of development” (China’s National Climate change Program, 2007).
China insists that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of GHG has
originated from developed countries, while the per capita emissions in developing countries
are still relatively low and their share will grow to meet their social and development needs.
As a developing party to the UNFCCC, China takes “fully into account that economic and
social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities.” (China’s
National Climate change Program, 2007)
Improving energy efficiency remains high on the agenda. To help China meets the
challenging targets to improve energy efficiency and reduce pollution, the government is
working on adjusting the performance evaluation system for local government officials and
SOE top management, including the performance in environment protection and energy
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efficiency as criteria (Xinhua, July 31, 2007). The government is taking additional initiatives
in setting standards, trying to close down inefficient power plants and steel and cement plants
(see May 2007 Quarterly Update, p.14). The government is reluctant to use price increases at
times of high inflation. Nonetheless, such considerations should probably not block needed
price adjustments because, in the long run, price adjustments towards levels that reflect
economic scarcity and social costs and benefits have a positive impact on resource allocation
and economic efficiency, and will help in the efforts to reduce energy intensity (The World
Bank quarterly, September 2007).
The Chinese claim to place great importance to the issue of climate change, but as a
"developing country," they will only address climate change within the overall context of
"national sustainable development strategy." The report estimated that global warming
emissions in China have doubled between 1994 and 2004 from 3 trillion to 6 trillion tons of
CO2 equivalent. However, they view these emissions in per capita terms, by which measure
they are very low. Their immense population provides them the cover they need to avoid any
mandatory emission caps.
During the Bali island conference, December 7th, 2007, China’s delegation insisted
that “any future arrangement on climate change should continue to follow the principles of
common but differentiated responsibilities established in the Convention, addressing climate
change within the framework of sustainable development, equal treatment of mitigation and
adaptation, and effectively solve the problem of financing and technology which the
developing country parties are most concerned.” And “The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol
is the ROAD, and the Montreal action plan is the MAP.” (China’s Statement on the Agenda
Item of Enhancing Implementation of the Convention, 2007) China thinks the Developed
Countries should at least reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 25%-40% by 2020
compared to 1990 levels.
On May 20, 2009, China issues the white paper to state its attitude and position on the
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. In that, China urges that all the developed
countries to implement the Bali roadmap. Taking the Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities, China thinks that developed countries shall take responsibility for their
historical cumulative emissions and current high per capita emissions to change their
unsustainable way of life and to substantially reduce their emissions and, at the same time, to
provide financial support and transfer technology to developing countries. At the same time,
developing countries will, in pursuing economic development and poverty eradication, take
proactive measures to adapt to and mitigate climate change (Implementation of the Bali
roadmap: China’s Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, 2009).
In short, the world's biggest contributor to global warming is in denial about the
problem, unwilling to make serious changes out of fear of harming its economies. China’s
climate change policy heavily relies on the advancement of science and technology instead of
modification of development model.
3. The Reason Behind China’s Policy
Global warming is a member of a special type of economic activity known as global public
goods. These are economic or other activities whose impacts are indivisible and whose
influences are felt around the world rather than affecting one nation, town, or family. There
are at least two kind of public goods: some activities called focal public goods in which good
policies appear obvious or consensual to most people; for example, it does not take much
persuasion to convince people that a reasonable standard is zero AIDS, zero smallpox, zero
swine flu. By contrast, with economic public goods, it is difficult to determine and reach
agreement on efficient policies because they involve estimating and balancing costs and
benefits where neither is easy to measure and both involve major distributional concerns.
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Global warming is a kind of economic public goods that involve huge numbers of economic
agents in a large number of countries, in which the costs and benefits of action do not indicate
any obvious focal policy or technological fix. (Nordhaus, 2007).
First of all, the question of climate change must be of concern to local, national and
international communities for purely prudential reasons: sharp changes in wealth, the
exacerbation of extreme poverty, and severe food insecurity can all be expected to breed
tension and armed conflict. Who will bear the burdens of that change? Who will be better off
and who worse off?
The development history and trend of various countries has revealed the obvious
positive correlations between per capita CO2 emissions, per capita commercial energy
consumption and the economic development level. In other words, with current level of
science and technology, to reach the same level as the industrialized countries, it is inevitable
that per capita energy consumption and CO2 emissions will reach a fairly high level. In the
history of the world, there is no precedent in that a high per capita GDP goes with absolutely
low per capita energy consumption. The Montreal Protocol worked very well when rich
countries agreed to include a significant financial transfer mechanism in the global treaty.
But, this kind of compensatory justice lesson is probably not transferable to the climate
change because that the ozone depletion issue required side payments if $1-2 billion, while
the stabilization of climate could cost rich countries hundreds of billions of dollars. (Roberts,
J. Timmons, & Parks, Bradley C., 2007).
Secondly, the global warming is all about inequality (Roberts, J. Timmons, & Parks,
Bradley C., 2007). China thinks the inequality is not only in which countries suffer its effect
most,, but also in which countries created the problem in the first place. In this regard,
China’s reluctance to commit to scheduled reductions in GHG emissions is not simply a
function of high discount rate and the weak technical and administrative abilities, but, more
fundamentally, is the result of a cumulative equity problems rooted in the conception of
global in equality.
Global warming is a global public good, the key environmental issue is global
emissions, and the key economic issue is how to balance costs and benefits of global
emissions reductions. Climate change depends only upon total GHG emissions and the time
path of emissions, not on the geographic location of emissions. Moreover, the impacts depend
primarily upon cumulative emissions that remain in the atmosphere, not on the annual flow of
emissions.
China’s basic rule of climate change is as easy as the kindergarten ethics that those
who created a mess should be responsible for cleaning their share of the mess. But, this rule
works as a double-blade sword which points to China itself at well as to the developed
countries at the same time. China’s attitude on this issue strongly influenced the G-77
position, which nearly entirely ignored the contingent form the small island states in that
China focuses on the adaptation of climate change instead of mitigation of global warming.
The small island states believe a fair agreement on climate change would immediately
stabilize the climate, forestall the complete destruction of island nations and cultures, and
address their basic economic needs and extraordinary vulnerability to climate-related stress
and natural disasters.
China insists that its GHG emission is survival one instead of luxury one. China
favors the per capita approach in which each person on Earth is given an equal right to the
ability of the atmosphere to absorb carbon. Under this proposal, China would be given
significant room to grow and emit because its per capita consumption of fossil fuels is
significantly lower than the world average level. At the same time, China also favors the
proposal of historical responsibility that would take into account the amount of damage done
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by countries in the past to the atmosphere’s ability to absorb more GHG. And demands the
developed countries to pay the carbon debt.
If the current protocol is extended at the current reduction rates, models indicate that
it will have little impact on global climate change (Nordhaus, 2007). Experts think that
increases in future emissions will primarily take place in the developing world because the
high rates of population and economic growth there. As a matter of fact, China’s rise will
inevitably come out with growing energy consumption and CO2 emissions. China made it
clear that among others, the fundamental political question is who will be responsible for the
bulk of future global greenhouse gas emissions. Almost all the countries agree that the
current accumulated stock of CO2 in the atmosphere is largely the responsibility of rich,
industrialized countries. Why should South Korea, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and other
states be off the hook if their per capita emissions and growth rates are much larger than that
of China? If we do not address this issue in a multilateral framework, there could be problems
ahead.
In short, global warming issue is something like the tragedy of commons; to this kind
of question, neither science nor economics can provide a ‘‘correct’’ answer to the question of
how to share the burden of reducing emissions.
4. Reputation-Based Price-Type Control Mechanism: Tentative Approach
The Economic Cost and Climate Injustice are two major concerns Chinese government
faces. This raises the issue of which approaches would be most likely to stimulate and
persuade China to take appropriate actions in the post-2012 climate regime.
To the first question, experts urge that high-income countries should provide financial
and technical assistance to low-income countries to induce developing countries’
participation. Some experts don’t think it in the same way. In his paper “To Tax or Not to
Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming”, economist William D. Nordhaus
compares quantity-oriented mechanisms like the Kyoto Protocol with price-type control
mechanisms such as internationally harmonized carbon taxes. His analysis focuses on such
issues as the relationship to ultimate targets, performance under conditions of uncertainty,
volatility of induced carbon prices, the inefficiencies of taxation and regulation, potential for
corruption and accounting finagling, and ease of implementation. He concludes that pricetype approaches such as carbon taxes have major advantages for slowing global warming
(Nordhaus, 2007). In the end, he suggests that price-type approaches such as HCTs are more
efficient instruments than quantity approaches like those found in the Kyoto Protocol. Under
the tax approach, countries set market penalties on GHG emissions at levels that are
equalized across different regions and industries. The tax would start relatively low and then,
unless the outlook changes for better or worse, rise steadily over time to reflect the increasing
prospective damages from global warming.
To the second question, a more logic way should be found. All the countries want to
pay as little as possible, and are unlikely to participate voluntarily unless they have a positive
net benefit or face the high pressure. The absence of socially shared understanding of fairness
and justice can reinforce zero-sum worldviews and causal beliefs, erode conditions of mutual
trust, promote risk aversion, and foster retaliatory attitudes.
As Garrett Hardin (Sankar, Ulaganathan, 2001) pointed out that there is no technical
solution to the problem of tragedy of commons, if the world countries continue to look for
solutions in the area of science and technology only, the result will be to worsen the situation.
It is crucial to have a mechanism whereby countries ‘‘graduate’’ into a set of obligations that
are commensurate with their abilities to pay—in a way that is similar to the ‘‘ability to pay’’
principle of an income tax system. Part of the challenge is designing a fair graduation
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procedure; another part is overcoming the Westphalia dilemma of inducing countries to
participate when graduation day comes.
The issue of global climate change, which itself is characterized by tremendous
inequality in vulnerability, responsibility, and mitigation, can therefore not be viewed
analyzed, or responded to in isolation from the larger crisis of global inequality. Any
effective post-Kyoto climate treaty will have to address credibility, compensatory justice, the
strategic leverage of major global environmental actors, and national development profiles,
which bear heavily on states’ willingness and ability to ratify these treaties. (Roberts, J.
Timmons, & Parks, Bradley C., 2007).
Climate change is a high profile issue because GHG emissions currently arise from
virtually all aspects of the global economy. International regulations of GHG emissions thus
impinges on sovereignty which states are reluctant to concede, as evidenced by protracted
debates on the need for legally binding reductions targets, the legal personality of the COP,
majority-voting decision-making and procedures for determining non-compliance. (Farhana
Yamin and Joanna Depledge, 2004, p 3.)
The increasingly large role of China in the global economy means that international
pressure become more and more sensitive to China’s growth and its prospects. Indeed, this
influence may in part be self-fulfilling, with markets responding to changes in expectations
about China’s growth prospects even beyond what would be reasonable on the basis of
China’s weight in the world economy. By contrast, China has the technical, financial, and
administrative capacity than those least developed countries (LDC). 3 Then comes the
question: is it possible that China would take any policy to build up its good reputation?
Since the end of the cold war, China has markedly deepened the extent of its
participation in international institutions with great speed. But the most significant thing is
that China has initiated a clustered series of costly and risky endeavors that benefited the
welfare of target states. What are the dominant causes and the prime goal of China’s foreign
strategy by institutional engagement? All the independent states are motivated more by their
own conceptions of self-interest than by devotion to the common good if any. With the deep
involvement in the globalization, China has changed its world picture, and holds that a new
world war will be unlikely in the foreseeable future. Knowing the cost of getting rid of the
network of interdependence, the realistic China wants to bring about a fairly long period of
peace in the world and a favorable climate in areas around itself. China has made it clear
several times that no matter how the international situation changes, it will keep pursuing the
independent foreign policy of peace on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence. Thus, it goes logically that the socialized China has an incentive to reassure
others. China tries to promote trust by adopting a new reassurance strategy, which can be
called institutional engagement (Wang, 2007).
China’s position in the international climate negotiations has rarely deviated from the
rest of the developing world, as collectively articulated by the Group of 77 (G-77), a group of
130 (formerly 77) developing countries. Recently, the financial incentives for emissions
reductions provided by the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has also
helped shape China’s views on the international climate regime (Lewis, Joanna, 2007). Thus,
Developing-country solidarity has been used as a strategy since the early days to influence
climate change negotiations. But, with the growing economic differentiation and often
disparate climate policy interests within them, the developing world is getting more and more
diversified on their perspectives on the historical responsibility of GHG and emitting rights
per capita. For example, some international group states like the members in SIDS hold
strongly different point of view from those leading developing countries like China and India.
3
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Put in another way, China will face increasing international pressure in the
future to devote more commitment to climate change, both due to its emergence as the
largest successor on the background of global financial crisis and as international
attention to climate change is elevated by government leaders and heads of state in
high-profile forums around the world.
To sum up, the world is beginning to consider the structure of climate-change
policies for the period after 2008–2012. Some countries are adopting their own
climate-change policies containing some mixture of emissions limits and technology
standards. But China made it clear that it will not take any emissions cut in the near
future. International structure will provide higher pressure to force China to take
action.
5. Conclusion
China’s rapid development and economic miracle would become an environmental
disaster if China’s energy use is still especially unclean and inefficient, which brings
consequences for the country and world. As China’s current emissions and
populations grow faster than the ones in developed countries, any comprehensive
treaty in the 21st century will be futile without China’s cooperation. The Economic
Cost and Climate Injustice are two major concerns Chinese government faces. This
raises the issue of which approach would be most likely to stimulate and persuade
China to take appropriate actions in the post-2012 climate regime. The price-type
approach incorporating the perspective of state reputation could visualize the
possibility that China would take new Climate Policy and low-carbon economic
development models. It argues that the sticks-type policies are most unlikely to push
China to take actions or adopt measures because China’s growing economic and
military power, rising political influence, and increasing involvement in regional and
international institutions have fundamentally affected the world system. However,
since China builds up its reputation by focusing on the multilateral commitments, the
reputation-based price-type control mechanism could be the Pareto Improvement
that encourages China to contribute its fair share to the global climate effort.

Appendix I: Cumulative CO2 emissions (1990-2005), (SEI, 2007)

398

Appendix II: National “Obligation Wedges”, (SEI,2007)

Appendix III: Chinese participation in a GDRs World, (SEI,2007)
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